Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
Spring 2000

The Parsimony of Libertarianism
James E. Fleming
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James E. Fleming, The Parsimony of Libertarianism , in 17 Constitutional Commentary 171 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2766

This Article is brought to you for free and open access
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of
Law. For more information, please contact
lawlessa@bu.edu.

Essay

THE PARSIMONY OF LIBERTARIANISM
James E. Fleming*
I want to begin by congratulating Randy Barnett on writing
The Structure of Liberty,' one of the most radical and provocative works of political and legal theory that I have ever read. I
consider myself to be a liberal who prizes liberty. Barnett claims
to provide an account of the structure of liberty along with "[t]he
liberal conception of justice" and the rule of law.2 His is a radical libertarian account centrally concerned with protecting the
fundamental natural rights of property, first possession, freedom
of contract, and self-defense. In Barnett's world, the fabled libertarian night-watchman state has been downsized and privatized: It is a world of private courts, private police, and private
prisons where inmates work to earn enough money to pay restitution to their victims.
If this is liberalism, it is enough to make me an anti-liberal,
at least of the civic republican, progressive, and radical feminist
strains. Indeed, for years I have been defending liberalism
against criticisms by such anti-liberals, charging that they were
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Faculty Fellow in Ethics,
Harvard University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000. I am grateful to
Randy Barnett, Bob Gordon, and Linda McClain for valuable comments on a draft of
this essay and to Abner Greene and Ben Zipursky for helpful conversations concerning
its arguments. I presented an earlier version of the essay at a panel on "The Structure of
Liberty" during the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, January 9, 1999. The panel also included presentations by Sandy Levinson and Fred Schauer
and a reply by Randy Barnett, and I benefited from hearing their remarks. Quinnipiac
College School of Law held a conference on Barnett's The Structure of Liberty, and I
learned from conversations with three of the participants in that conference, Arthur Ripstein, Larry Sager, and Larry Solum.
1. Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law
(Clarendon Press, 1998).
2. Id. at 63-83.
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attacking a caricature of liberalism. Well, Barnett's book embodies the caricature of liberalism that they attack. I mean this
as a compliment: His book provides a caricature of liberalism by
boldly exaggerating some of its characteristic features, in particular, its libertarianism and its fear of state power. Indeed,
Barnett's The Structure of Liberty should join (if not replace)
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia3 in the standard,
obligatory footnote references to libertarian political and legal
theory.
There is much to praise and much to criticize in Barnett's
provocative book, and it deserves vigorous and thoroughgoing
engagement: I shall focus on three points. The first relates to
his account of "the" liberal conception of justice. The second
concerns his natural law method of reasoning, in particular, his
ambitious expansion of H.L.A. Hart's famous notion of the
minimum content of natural law. The third relates to his account
of the rule of law, in particular, his aggressive elaboration of Lon
Fuller's well-known conception of the formal principles of legality to include a requirement of "compossibility" and the parsimony of rights. Thus, my essay is titled "The Parsimony of Libertarianism."
I. "THE" LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE
John Rawls gave his classic work of political theory the
modest title A Theory of Justice.4 Barnett labors under no such
modesty. He claims to develop "[t]he liberal conception of justice.",5 To be sure, he sometimes calls his conception that of "the
classical liberal approach.",6 But he does not systematically distinguish, or articulate the connection, between his conception of
liberalism and other, non-classical versions of it. If both Rawls
and Barnett are liberals, We must ask, "How capacious is the
tradition of liberalism?" 7
As I stated previously, I have spent years defending liberalism against anti-liberal critics, including civic republicans, progressives, and radical feminists. My move is generally to argue
that (a broadly Rawlsian) liberalism is more capacious than such
3. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974).
4. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Harvard U. Press, 1971).
5. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 63-83 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 15.
7. I have benefited from discussing with Samuel Freeman the question of whether
libertarianism is a liberal view at all. He thinks not.
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anti-liberals have recognized and to argue that liberalism, properly conceived or reconstructed, can be synthesized with civic
republicanism, progressivism, and feminism.' The resulting liberal republicanism or liberal feminism yields a conclusion that
liberalism can sponsor a limited formative project. Under such a
liberalism, government should secure the basic liberties that are
preconditions for self-government in two senses: not only deliberative democracy but also deliberative autonomy. Securing
these two sorts of preconditions, I argue, would afford everyone
the common and guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship
in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy.
In making such moves, I sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly distance liberalism from classical liberalism or
libertarianism. Barnett's book prompts the question: Should
liberalism be capacious enough to include libertarian theories
like his? Or should it exclude such theories, notwithstanding
Barnett's claim to develop "the" liberal conception of justice?
In analyzing the development of the tradition of liberalism from
classical liberalism to contemporary liberalism, Stephen Holmes
has argued that it has been characterized by a shifting understanding of insecurity, ranging from fear of state power to fear of
"private" power." Barnett's liberalism reflects no such shift in
the understanding of the sources of insecurity: The only ground
of insecurity in his account is the fear of state power." Or, with
respect to other sources of insecurity that might seem to call for
is
the intervention of state power, he argues that the medicine
12
"far more troublesome and dangerous than the disease."
What is at stake here is whether liberalism, properly so
called, can justify a limited formative project of government to
secure the preconditions for self-government through legislation.
Such a formative project would share (some) common ground
with civic republicanism, progressivism, and radical feminism.
8. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Securing DeliberativeAutonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(1995) ("Fleming, Securing"); James E. Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993) ("Fleming, Constructing"); James E. Fleming and Linda

C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 509 (1997) (book review); see also Linda C. McClain, Toleration,Autonomy, and GovernmentalPromotion
of Good Lives: Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 Ohio St. L. J. 19

(1998).
9. See, e.g., Fleming, Securing at 43-46 (cited in note 8).
10. Stephen Holmes, Passionsand Constraint:On the Theory of LiberalDemocracy
257-60 (U. of Chicago Press, 1995).
11. Barnett, The Structureof Liberty at 238-50 (cited in note 1).
12. Id. at 302 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
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Barnett's version of liberalism radically questions the justice and
the legitimacy of such legislation (and, for that matter, practically all legislation). Indeed, if there were a contest as to what
work of libertarian theory runs the most pages before acknowledging the existence of legislatures and of legislation, Barnett's
book might win: legislation is not mentioned until page 124.
And even there, he does not acknowledge the legitimacy of legislation. Instead, in the course of waxing eloquent about the
characteristics of common-law adjudication, he expresses doubts
about the original idea that errors in the common law "were
supposed to be corrected by occasional acts of legislation."' 3 He
goes on to complain: "Today, legislation is hardly extraordinary4
and is hardly confined to correcting doctrinal errors of courts."
He continues:
Indeed, for some time now the legislative process has tended
to overshadow and even to supplant common-law processes
as the principal engine of legal discovery and change. This
has meant that legal evolution has sometimes been replaced
by legal revolution-and the disruption and hubris that typically accompanies revolutions-as the dominant approach to
legal change.
Even more remarkably, in a section on "[f]aw and [1]egislation"
in his fable imagining a polycentric constitutional order, he does
not refer to legislation enacted by legislatures.16 Instead, he
states that "judicial opinions are commonly supplemented by
reference to 'codes' or legislation written by authoritative outside institutions" such as the American Law Institute's Restatements of the Laws or the legal experts who write treatises.
I am grateful to Barnett for sharpening and clarifying the
differences between classical liberalism and the liberalism that I
wish to develop and defend (by synthesizing it with civic republicanism, progressivism, and feminism). And I am grateful to him
for providing me with a citation to use in deflecting anti-liberal
critiques of liberalism. I no longer have to object that they attack a caricature of liberalism. Instead, I can employ a strategy
of confession and avoidance: I can confess that their criticisms
are well-taken against versions of liberalism like Barnett's, but I
13. Id. at 124.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16.

Id. at 284-97.

17.

Id. at 289.
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can avoid those criticisms by arguing that they do not apply to
versions of liberalism like Rawls's (or for that matter, Ronald
Dworkin's, s Bruce Ackerman's, 9 or my own).
Here we should ask Barnett, just how capacious is liberalism? Does he mean, by claiming to elaborate "the" liberal conception of justice, to write Rawls, Dworkin, and others out of the
canon of liberalism? How would he conceive the core, and the
boundaries, of liberalism? How does he conceive the differences, and the connections, between his conception of liberalism
and those of Rawls, Dworkin, and others?
II. THE NATURAL LAW METIHOD OF ANALYSIS
A
Barnett openis his book with a perspicacious account of
what he calls "The Natural Law Method of Analysis."''2 He
rightly points out that the idea of natural law, despite its long
and distinguished pedigree, is mysterious to many today.21 And
he proudly and expertly contributes to the revival or reconstruction of natural law and natural rights that is currently underway.
He seeks to demystify the idea of natural law reasoning, describing it as a "hypothetical imperative"2 method of reasoning
with the following structure: "Given that the nature of human
beings and the world in which they live is X, if we want to
achieve Y, then we ought to do Z."'
Barnett imaginatively interprets H.L.A. Hart's well-known
notion of "the minimum content of natural law" 24 in terms of
that structure or method of reasoning.2 According to Barnett,
"Hart takes as 'given' five contingent facts about 'human nature
and the world in which men live': (a) human vulnerability, (b)
approximate equality, (c) limited altruism, (d) limited resources
and (e) limited understanding and strength of will."'' Barnett

18.
19.

See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard U. Press, 1977).
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, SocialJustice in the Liberal State (Yale U. Press,

1980).
20. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 4-12 (cited in note 1).
21. Id. at 4.
22.

Id. at 7.

23. Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).
24. SeeH.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 189-95 (Clarendon Press, 1961).
25. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 10-12 (cited in note 1).
26. Id. at 11.
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continues: "He then assumes, on the basis of observation, the
additional contingent fact that most people desire to survive ....27 Finally, "Hart concludes that, given these five factual conditions, if persons desire to survive, then their legal systems ought to have [certain] features" ' or rules such as those
which make up what Hart calls "the minimum content of natural
law.,,
So far so good. Barnett then proceeds to a more ambitious
elaboration of Hart's "core of good sense" yielded by this type
of natural law reasoning ° Here is where the troubles begin.
First, Barnett expands the given. To Hart's five contingent facts
about human nature and the world in which humans live, he
adds three pervasive social problems that confront every society:
the problems of knowledge, interest, and power.31 Second, he
expands the if. In addition to Hart's objective of survival, he
posits three other objectives: the pursuit of happiness, peace, and
prosperity. 2 Finally, Barnett expands the then: from Hart's
minimum content of natural law to a full-blown libertarian account of "the liberal conception of justice-as defined by natural
rights - and the rule of law." 33
I said here is where the troubles begin for the following basic reason: the appeal or "core of good sense"' in Hart's notion
of the "minimum content of natural law" 35 lies in its very minimalism. Hart was trying to find common ground between the
traditions of natural law and legal positivism, both by pruning
the natural law tradition of its grandiose claims about human nature and the necessary connection between law and morality,
and by pruning the legal positivist tradition of its radical relativist claims that there was no necessary content to the laws of a legitimate legal system.36 Hart was trying to distill an extremely
uncontroversial "core of good sense" that all reasonable persons
could agree upon concerning, in Barnett's terms, the given (the
picture of human nature and the nature of the world in which
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (quoting Hart, Concept of Law at 189-95 (cited in note 24)) (emphasis omit-

ted).
30. Id. at 12 (quoting Hart, Concept of Law at 194 (cited in note 24)).
31. Id. at 17.
32.

Id. at 16.

33. Id. at 22, see also id. at 17.
34. Hart, Concept of Law at 194 (cited in note 24).
35. Id. at 189-95.
36. Id. at 181-89.

2000]

PARSIMONY OF LIBERTARIANISM

humans live); the if (the objectives that humans are to pursue);
and the then (the content of the laws that humans should enact).
And so, any expansion of the given, the if, or the then in Hart's
idea of the minimum content of natural law is very likely to lose
the appeal or the core of good sense in his notion.
This proves to be the case with Barnett's ambitious elaboration of Hart's idea. His expansions of the given, the if, and the
then all are extremely controversial, and are at once too much
and too little in ways that I shall explain. First, consider Barnett's expansion of the given to include the problems of knowledge, interest, and power. This is too much in the sense that the
given is now far more controversial and problematic than it was
in Hart's formulation. It is too little in the sense that, once we
open the door to include the three problems identified by Barnett, numerous other problems will vie for inclusion. To name a
few: the problem of need, the problem of envy, the problem of
diversity (or of reasonable moral pluralism), the problem of
equal concern and respect, the problem of self-respect, the
problem of care (and of dependency and interdependency), the
problem of security (and of vulnerability), the problem of realizing our capacities, and the like!'
Barnett may be right in identifying the problems of knowledge, interest, and power as fundamental. Indeed, if they were
the only or even the primary problems in the world in which we
live, his proposed resolution of them might make a significant
and lasting contribution to political and legal theory. He certainly makes an imaginative and rigorous argument for a libertarian conception of justice and the rule of law from the premise
that these are the fundamental problems of the human condition. And we should commend him for being so clear about this
premise. For his doing so makes clear the glaring omissions in
his theory. To paraphrase Hart on Holmes, Barnett has the virtue that when he is clearly wrong, he is wrong clearly."
But Barnett does not provide a persuasive argument that
the three problems of knowledge, interest, and power are so
fundamental that they trump, override, or rule out of bounds
other problems (or that they exhaust the problems that a conception of justice and the rule of law should address). To be
37. I understand that Larry Sager advanced this sort of criticism of Barnett in the
Quinnipiac conference.
38. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in Essays in
Jurisprudenceand Philosophy49,49 (Clarendon Press, 1983).
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sure, he alludes to the "other problems" objection in the final
chapter of the book. 9 But that is simply too short a dismissal of
this criticism. Furthermore, it becomes highly doubtful whether
Barnett, once he adds the problems of knowledge, interest, and
power to the given, is merely reasoning from facts about human
nature and the human condition, as he seems to claim,40 rather
than engaging in moral reasoning or normative political theory.41
Second, consider Barnett's expansion of the if to include the
pursuit of happiness, peace, and prosperity. Again, this is both
too much and too little. Too much in that, once we move beyond the objective of survival, we are dealing with objectives
that are far more controversial and problematic. Too little in
that, once we open the door to objectives beyond survival, other
objectives will compete with the pursuit of happiness, peace, and
prosperity as candidates for inclusion. For example, to take a
famous trilogy, what about the ends of equality and fraternity in
addition to liberty? And what about the ends of human excellence or virtue? Dignity and autonomy? Community? Again,
Barnett does not adequately defend his decision to focus on the
pursuit of happiness, peace, and prosperity to the exclusion or
neglect of such other objectives.
Third and finally, I could also make the too much, too little
objection to Barnett's expansion of the then. It is too much in
that once we move beyond the minimum content of natural law,
the content becomes far more controversial and problematic. It
is too little in that Barnett's libertarian conception of justice
seems merely to be a conception of liberty. It is not a full conception of justice at all, not even after he goes through eight refinements or formulations of it.42 Rather, it is a conception of
liberty that acknowledges constraints on liberty, but only for the
sake of liberty, not also for the sake of other principles, rights, or
values.43
The point of my criticisms concerning the natural law
method of reasoning is not that it is inappropriate for Barnett
ambitiously to build upon Hart's analysis, or to engage in the
natural law method of reasoning. And I certainly do not wish to
39. Barnett, The Structureof Liberty at 325-26 (cited in note 1).
40. Id. at 4-12.
41. I understand that Arthur Ripstein developed a version of this type of criticism
at the Quinnipiac conference. Sandy Levinson also did so at the AALS panel.
42. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 83,102, 104,159,181, 190,205,214 (cited in
note 1).
43.

Id. at 63-83.
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imply that any political theory or legal theory, to be acceptable,
must be uncontroversial or must command the assent of all reasonable persons. Far from it. My point rather is that Barnett, by
expanding Hart's idea of the minimum content of natural law,
loses the appeal or the core of good sense in his notion. Again,
the key to Hart's success is the very minimalism of his idea of the
minimum content of natural law.
B
Barnett does not develop a full-blown constitutional theory
in The Structure of Liberty, nor does he advance a natural law
method of constitutional interpretation. 44 But the book's implications for constitutional theory are clear enough. Barnett suggests that the principles he identifies as part of the liberal conception of justice and the rule of law inform the meaning of the
"rights 'retained by the people' that the Ninth Amendment says
shall not be 'denied or disparaged' or of the 'privileges or immunities of citizens' protected from state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment," as well as the meaning of "due process of
law" mentioned in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 5 He
4
also makes clear that he would interpret the Takings Clause 1
the Necessary and Proper Clause,47 the Second Amendment
right to bear arms,.4 and the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition
of involuntary servitude 49 in light of his conception of justice and
the rule of law. Furthermore, in another work he has called for
getting normative in constitutional theory by engap'mg in natural
rights reasoning in constitutional interpretation.
And so it
seems appropriate to raise some doubts about interpreting the
Constitution along the lines he suggests.
One objection, paraphrasing Holmes's dissent in Lochner,
might be that the Constitution does not enact Mr. Randy Barnett's The Structure of Liberty,
.51 any more than it enacts Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.' I usually am skeptical about such
44. Barnett is developing a full-blown constitutional theory in a book in progress,
The Presumption of Liberty.
45. Id. at 25 & n.79.
46. Id. at 25.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 238-39.
49. Id. at 248-49.
50. See Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 12 Const. Comm. 93 (1995).
51. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics").
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paraphrases of Holmes's dissent, with all their smugness and
their purported dispositive, conversation-stopping force. 2 But
here I think that such an invocation of Holmes's dissent is particularly apt, given the family resemblance between Barnett's
libertarianism and Spencer's (even if Barnett does not obviously
subscribe to a social Darwinism of the sort attributed to
Spencer).-3
Another objection might be that Barnett's liberal conception of justice does not comport with the original understanding
of the Constitution. One version of this criticism would be that
the founding generation did not believe in natural rights or did
not accept the natural rights method of analysis!" Another version would be that even if they did, they did not believe that
natural rights were a source of legal claims to be made in a
court.55 Yet another, more specific, version would be that the
founding generation did not accept libertarian views of the
Takings Clause of the sort Barnett would advance 6 and that a
fortiori they would not have accepted his full liberal conception
of justice and the rule of law.
I do not intend to make any of these objections. Instead, I
want to make two different objections: one, that it is not persuasive to ground a liberal constitutional conception of justice on
the prepolitical conception of human nature that Barnett deploys; and two, that Barnett's liberal conception of justice, applied to interpreting our Constitution, would not adequately fit
or justify our constitutional document and practice.
First, Barnett purports to ground his liberal conception of
justice on a prepolitical conception of human nature (indeed, on
an account of the facts of human nature), s I sympathize with the
idea of grounding our basic liberties on a conception of the person. But, following Rawls, I have attempted to ground our basic
liberties on a rather different conception of the person: a conception of the person as free and equal citizen, and as having two
52. See, e.g., Fleming, Securing at 43-44 (cited in note 8); Fleming, Constructingat
301-04 (cited in note 8).
53. See Barnett, The Structure ofLiberty at 73,76 (cited in note 1).
54. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory of JudicialReview
39 (Harvard U. Press, 1980).
55. See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions,102 Yale L.J. 907,932-33 (1993).
56. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings
Clauseand the PoliticalProcess,95 Colum. L. Rev. 782,819-25 (1995).
57. See Barnett, The Structure ofLiberty at 4-12 (cited in note 1).
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moral powers, the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity
for a conception of the good.!' Applying this idea, I worked up a
constitutional theory with two fundamental themes corresponding to these two moral powers: securing the basic liberties that
are necessary for deliberative democracy and securing the basic
liberties that are necessary for deliberativeautonomy. Together,
these two themes afford everyone the common and guaranteed
status of free and equal citizenship in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy."
Note that this conception of the person does not purport to
be a prepolitical conception of the person, or to stem from the
facts of human nature. Rather, it is a political conception of the
person, and it is a construct that is posited in order to account
for, and provide a basis for justifying, the basic liberties that
comprise an ongoing practice and tradition of constitutional democracy. The claim is that these basic liberties are expressed in
or presupposed by our constitutional document and underlying
constitutional order. 6
Here I would like to play upon the title of an article by Barnett, Getting Normative:' If he gets normative by getting naturalist, I get normative by getting constructivist. 2 We need not
and should not get normative by getting naturalist. My constructivist conception is not foundationalist or moral realist. It recognizes the independence of constitutional theory from deep, conMost
troversial metaphysical questions of philosophy.
importantly, it recognizes the irrelevance, for the content of
rights, of their status as natural rights. It is decidedly, and designedly, less deep, if you will, than foundationalist or moral realist accounts. For this very reason, I submit, it is more appropriate as a method of constitutional interpretation than is
Barnett's natural rights method. Constructivism also has the virtue of charting a third way between natural law and legal positivism.

58.

See John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism 19,302,332 (Columbia U. Press, 1993).

59. See Fleming, Securing at 19-20 (cited in note 8); Fleming, Constructing at 287898 (cited in note 8).
60.

See Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism at 29-35,299-304 (cited in note 58).

61. Barnett, 12 Const. Comm. at 93 (cited in note 50).
62.

In other works, I have outlined and developed a constitutional constructivism

by analogy to Rawls's political constructivism, a theory developed in his book Political
Liberalism. See Fleming, Securing at 2, 17-23 (cited in note 8); Fleming, Constructingat

217, 281-97 (cited in note 8).
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The second reason that we should reject Barnett's liberal
conception of justice in interpreting the Constitution is because-using the terms of Dworkin's two dimensions of best interpretation, fit and justification-it does not adec~uately fit or
justify our constitutional document and practice.
Barnett's
radical libertarian conception would entail that much, if not
most, of our practice is unconstitutional; that many, if not most,
of our precedents are wrongly decided; and that much, if not
most, of our federal and state legislation is unconstitutional. I
certainly do not mean to imply that the best constitutional theory may not be critical of some of our practices, precedents, and
legislation. Still, to be eligible as a constitutional theory, it must
fit most while criticizing some. I do not wish to seem to take a
dim view of political theory that is radical, in the sense of making
recourse to first principles and being willing to criticize much of
extant practice as unjust. But I do mean to say that Barnett's
book, precisely to the extent that it is eye-opening and laudable
as a work of radical political theory, is problematic in its implications for constitutional theory. Again, I daresay that it (extrapolated to constitutional theory) would fail both the test of fit
and justification. In sum, his political theory is so radical that, as
a matter of constitutional interpretation, it is out of bounds.
III. THE RULE OF LAW: COMPOSSIBILITY AND THE
PARSIMONY OF LIBERTARIANISM
If my second criticism focused on Barnett's ambitious expansion of a feature of H.L.A. Hart's legal theory, it is perhaps
appropriate that my third criticism focuses on Barnett's expansion of a feature of Lon Fuller's legal theory (given the prominence in a prior generation of the Hart-Fuller debate on the relationship between law and morality). In elaborating upon rule
of law principles, Barnett draws upon Fuller's well-known account of the formal principles of legality (or the eight ways Rex
can fail to make law)." Fuller's fifth principle-proscribing the
enactment of contradictory ruleso-seems innocuous and unproblematic enough in itself.
But Barnett reads "[t]he
63. For Dworkin's formulations of the two dimensions of best interpretation, fit and
justification, see, e.g, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 239 (Harvard U. Press, 1986);
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle143-45 (Harvard U. Press, 1985); Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 107 (cited in note 18).
64. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 89-99 (cited in note 1) (drawing upon Lon
L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 38-39 (Yale U. Press, 2d ed. 1969)).
65. Fuller, Morality of Law at 39 (cited in note 64).
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[r]equirement of [c]ompossibility" into it." That requirement
forbids conflict among fights, or proscribes recognizing any
rights that conflict with other rights. 6r
Barnett takes issue with the common view that valid rights
may conflict with each otheri8 In particular, he criticizes Jeremy
Waldron's treatment of rights in conflict. According to Barnett:
Waldron... argues -that with theories of rights based on interests, conflicts of rights are nearly inevitable and require
"trade-offs" among rights. Waldron would make some of
these trade-offs by "establish[ing] the relative importance of
the interests at stake..." and by "try[ing] to maximize our

promotion of what we take to be important." In other cases,
he would establish an "internal relationofbetween
69 moral considerations" to handle conflicting claims rights.
Barnett rejects this view. He argues that it results in part from
an inflation of mere claims into rights and in part from ignoring
the informational role played by a compossible set of rights, that
is, a set of rights that do not conflict.7 He argues instead that
rights must be compossible: "In a perfectly compossible set of
rights, every right could be exercised according to its terms without any right in the set conflicting with any other."' He contends: "The compossibility of rights is functionally necessary to
achieving an order of actions, because people need the information that rights provide as to how they may act to pursue
2 happiothers."
of
actions
the
with
conflicts
avoiding
ness while
Furthermore, Barnett argues that "Fuller's fifth requirement of legality argues for a parsimony of rights."7 Therefore,
he argues: "However attractive a particular claim of right may
be, if it conflicts with other rights that are essential to solving the
knowledge problem-such as the rights to several property or to
freedom of contract-it violates the re.uirement of compossibility and its validity is highly suspect." This is a remarkable
66. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty at 90-94 (cited in note 1).
67. Id.
6S. Id. at 91.
69. Id. at 93 (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers1981-1991 at 203, 223-24 (Cambridge U. Press, 1993)) (alterations in original).
70. Id. at 91, 93.
71. Id. at 92.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 91.
74. Id. at 92.
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case of form-the concern for compossibility and parsimonyplacing important constraints on substance, as Barnett acknowledges. 5 It is remarkable to presume that Barnett's favored
rights trump all other rights simply because of the requirement
of compossibility and a tidy concern to avoid, in advance, the
possibility of conflicts among rights. Waldron is certainly right
to observe that "the price for this tidiness is a severe limitation
on the types of moral concerns that can be articulated [as
rights]." We should ask whether such tidiness is worth the
price. I think not.
I conclude this despite the fact that to some extent I share
Barnett's concern for parsimony or, as I would put it, elegance in
the construction of a theory, and despite the fact that I too believe that we should take rights seriously, as trumps rather than
as mere interests to be traded off or balanced against each other
or against governmental interests. There is a serious problem
concerning the criterion for determining priority in resolving or
avoiding conflicts that Barnett does not adequately face up to.
Even if we accept the requirement of compossibility for the sake
of argument, what entitles the rights to several property and
freedom of contract to priority over other asserted rights when
we apply that requirement to resolve or avoid conflicts between
rights? Barnett seems simply to assume that his rights have priority because they are, on his account, necessary to solve the
problems of knowledge, interest, and power. He seems implicitly to take a "first in time, first in right" approach here: Because
he has already elaborated these rights, and thus they already are
on hand, they have priority over any other rights than anyone
else might wish to assert.
Later in the book, Barnett again argues for a parsimony of
rights, arriving at what he calls "a natural rights version of Ockham's razor."' There he argues that "rights are a necessary evil"
rather than an unmitigated good.78 Ironically, rights are a necessary evil because, although we think of them as protecting us
against governmental power, they "legitimate the use of [governmental] force or violence to secure compliance."79 Therefore,
he worries, "[t]he more rights we recognize the more violence
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Waldron, LiberalRights at 204 (cited in note 69).
Barnett, The Structureof Liberty at 200 (cited in note 1).
Id.
Id.
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we legitimate."'O He continues: "Because each right legitimates
violence, the fewer we can manage with the better.""' He concludes: "Thus we arrive at a natural rights version of Ockham's
razor: To reduce the legitimated use of power in society that enforceable rights engender, any social problems, no matter how
serious, that can be handled adequately by other means should
be." 2
In my own writing in constitutional theory, I have pressed a
theme concerning "the importance of being elegant" (though not
too reductive) in constructing a constitutional theory." My concern for elegance has affinity to Barnett's concern for parsimony.
I have used the criterion of elegance in arguing for the superiority of my constitutional theory over other theories, for example,
that of Bruce Ackerman." I argued that a constitutional theory
of the sort I have developed, with the two fundamental themes
of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, can more
elegantly, straightforwardly, and plausibly account for our dualist constitutional scheme and the basic liberties that it secures
than can Ackerman's unwieldy theory."
I use the criterion of elegance in choosing among competing
accounts of our basic liberties and scheme of government, all of
which claim to fit and justify our constitutional document and
practice. Barnett, by contrast, does not use elegance, parsimony,
or Ockham's razor to choose among competing accounts of a
given phenomenon. For example, he does not argue that his account more parsimoniously accounts for a given set of rights
than do other, less elegant, theories. Instead, he uses parsimony
and Ockham's razor to shave off claims of rights that conflict
with the rights favored by his libertarian conception of justice.
(Actually, he uses them more like an ax to clear the field of
claims of rights that conflict with the rights he favors.) And so, I
prefer to speak of "the parsimony of libertarianism" or "Randy's
razor." Or, deploying a negative connotation of parsimony, to
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citations omitted).
83.

See Fleming, Securing at 29 (cited in note 8).

84. James E. Fleming, We the UnconventionalAmerican People, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1513, 1535-36 (1998). Ackerman's theory, with its complex apparatus of three republics
and of amendment and transformation of the Constitution outside the formal procedures
of Article V, is inelegant. "By his own self-deprecating characterization, it may appear to
be an 'unworkable Rube Goldberg contraption."' Id. at 1535 (citing Bruce Ackerman,
We the People:Foundations61 (Harvard U. Press, 1991)).
85.

Id. at 1536.
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speak of "the poverty of libertarianism." In conclusion, I would
argue for the importance of being elegant in constructing a constitutional theory but also for the importance of not being too
parsimonious or stingy in the recognition of rights.

